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Abstract
We discuss political economy mechanisms which can explain the re-
source curse, in which an increase in the size of resource rents causes a
decrease in the economy￿ s total value added. We identify a number of
channels through which resource rents will alter the incentives of a polit-
ical leader. Some of these induce greater investment by the leader in
assets that favour growth (infrastructure, rule of law, etc.), others lead to
a potentially catastrophic drop in such activities. As a result, the e⁄ect
of resource abundance can be highly non-monotonic. We argue that it
is critical to understand how resources a⁄ect the leader￿ s "survival func-
tion," i.e. the reduced-form probability of retaining power. We also brie￿ y
survey decentralised mechanisms, in which rents induce a reallocation of
labour by private agents, crowding out productive activity more than pro-
portionately. We argue that these mechanisms cannot be fully understood
without simultaneously studying leader behaviour.
1 Introduction
Between 1997 and 1999 oil prospectors found large oil deposits in the territorial
waters of Sªo TomØ and Principe. At the time of the discoveries per-capita
annual income in these West African islands was $510. The deposits are con-
servatively estimated to deliver a stream of revenue equivalent to a perpetuity
paying $100M per year, or $500 per person.1 Hence, per capita income has
doubled. One might have expected the response to the ￿nd to take the form
of jubilant crowds celebrating in the streets. Instead, foreign correspondents
￿We thank attendees of the 2007 OXCARRE launch conference, the editors and referees
for useful comments.
yLSE, NBER, and CEPR.
zLSE
1"Democratic Republic of Sªo TomØ and Pr￿ncipe: Selected Is-
sues and Statistical Appendix", International Monetary Fund, 2006,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06329.pdf
1reported nothing but gloom and despondency (e.g. Financial Times, January
27 2005). Why are Sªo TomØans so wary of this immense gift?
A possible answer is that they are looking across the Gulf of Guinea, which
separates them from Nigeria. Nigeria has exported around $10B worth of oil
every year since the 1970s, making up a third of its GDP, yet it has been unable
to use this revenue to stimulate growth: per-capita income as of today is roughly
on a par with its 1960 level. More stunningly, the fraction of the population
living on less than 1 dollar per day has gone from 36 to 70 percent [Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003)]. Hence, it is a fair assumption that for most Nigerians
living standards have actually declined. This is clearly not a promising precedent
for Sªo TomØ and Principe. Other countries in the region provide even more
anxiety-inducing scenarios: diamond-rich Sierra Leone, oil-rich Sudan, oil and
diamond-rich Angola, and rich-of-everything Democratic Republic of Congo, are
among the poorest countries in the world. Further a￿eld, there are plenty of
other sombre examples, and only a handful of tantalizing cases where resources
seem at least not to have done harm, and may indeed have contributed to higher
living standards.
These are the sort of casual observations that cause economists to talk of a
￿natural-resource curse.￿The ￿rst critical task for economists is to see whether
these casual observations can be elevated to empirical regularities. As we un-
derstand it, this is a daunting task. It consists in documenting that resource
windfalls (possibly under certain circumstances, to be established) lower living
standards, i.e. that living standards are causally lower following a windfall than
they would otherwise have been.2 Establishing this with cross-country data in-
volves formidable measurement, speci￿cation, and identi￿cation problems. Our
own reading of the literature is that consensus has so far proved elusive.
The second, perhaps easier, task is to identify possible theoretical mechan-
isms through which the curse, if there is one, operates. It is appropriate that this
e⁄ort takes place in parallel with the empirical work because explicit models of
the resource curse can provide guidance in attacking the issues of measurement,
speci￿cation, and identi￿cation we referred to above.
It is possible to distinguish three phases in academic theorizing about mech-
anisms of the resource curse: ￿rst, since the 1970s a series of ￿rentier state￿
discussions of the phenomenon have been given by political scientists, saying
that resource sectors and resource windfalls have a variety of negative e⁄ects
on state capacity; second, during the 1980s and 90s, a number of economic
explanations were given in which the resource sector crowds out other sectors
more important for growth, this type of mechanism is generally called ￿Dutch
disease￿ ; third, since 2000, several political economy models have been formu-
lated, in the spirit of the ￿rentier state,￿but exploring speci￿c mechanisms, and
con￿rming that the process can be individually rational for all actors.
In this paper we describe and try to evaluate some of the possible political
mechanisms that could lead to a resource curse, whether or not they have been
2This is of course a much stronger proposition than to say that windfalls reduce the growth
rate of the economy.
2previously formalized by others.
We propose a ￿rst distinction among political mechanisms which generate a
resource curse, between centralized and decentralized mechanisms. Centralized
mechanisms focus on the incentives and constraints faced by the political elite.
The elite is the direct recipient of resource revenue and its problem is how to
allocate this revenue (and its energy) between its own enrichment, activities that
increase the elite￿ s chances of retaining power, and investments that can increase
the economy￿ s capacity to produce non-resource income. This kind of model
clearly ￿ts authoritarian regimes best, but with appropriate reinterpretations it
can o⁄er insights into the workings of (more or less full) democracies as well.
We use a very simple reduced-form framework to illustrate a number of
possible ways in which an increase in resource abundance a⁄ects the decisions
of the elite. Broadly speaking, an increase in resource revenue a⁄ects the elite￿ s
decision problem through two main channels. First, since the elite is the direct
recipient of the resource revenue, an increase in that revenue increases the value
of staying in power, and hence the return to activities and expenditures that
shore up the elite￿ s political control. There are two broad scenarios under which
an increase in the value of staying in power can lead to a resource curse. In
one, the leader faces a binding budget or time constraint. When the return to
staying in power increases he thus substitutes away from productive activities
into activities that preserve him in power. In our reduced form model this is the
case of the ￿busy leader.￿In another, the activities undertaken by the leader
to stay in power have a negative spillover on the private sector, so a resource
curse can emerge even if the leader is unconstrained. We discuss this mechanism
under the heading of ￿patronage￿below.
Interestingly, however, the vice of an increased desire to stay in power may
easily turn into a social virtue. One way to increase one￿ s hold on power is to
make citizens happy, i.e. to provide plenty of opportunities in the private sector.
Hence, an increased desire to stay in power may lead to greater investments in
productive inputs for the private sector (see the ￿strategic leader￿below). Even
if the primary means chosen by the leader to reinforce his power is through
unproductive spending, such as a more pervasive security apparatus, the indirect
e⁄ect is to lengthen the leader￿ s planning horizon. This also may induce him to
spend more on productive activities as well (the ￿repressive leader￿ ). In such
cases, resource windfall are blessings, rather than curses.
The second main way a resource windfall a⁄ects the leader￿ s problem is by
increasing the likelihood that he will face a challenge for his political control.
Since leadership brings control of resources, potential challengers will be more
aggressive and more motivated when power brings greater spoils. The direct
e⁄ect is to shorten the leader￿ s horizon, and hence his perceived returns from
developing the non-resource economy (the ￿fatalistic￿leader). This e⁄ect can
be exacerbated if the leader responds to the greater probability of a challenge
by shifting more resources into wasteful self-preservation schemes. On the other
hand, in some cases a more e¢ cient response would be to counter the increased
incentives of outsiders to mount a challenge by improving the outside option
o⁄ered by the private sector. In this case once again the curse turns into a
3blessing. We brie￿ y sketch a model below that combines the increased prob-
ability of a challenge with incentives to both increase repression and increase
productive investments.3
There are two additional ways that resource windfalls a⁄ect the government
problem, but we argue that they are of secondary importance. One is that a
resource windfall relaxes the government￿ s budget constraint. In our view this
e⁄ect is unlikely, per se, to generate a curse. More resources allow the gov-
ernment to spend more on everything, including productive investments. This
is illustrated to a certain extent by our already-mentioned ￿repressive leader￿
model.4 The other is a wealth e⁄ect. An increase in resource revenue lowers the
leader￿ s marginal utility of consumption, and thus calls for more leisure. If the
increased leisure comes at the expense of time and energy devoted to productive
policy-making it is once again possible to generate a curse. We downplay this
mechanism, that we call the ￿lazy leader,￿because we suspect it is unlikely to
be of ￿rst-order importance (though several discussions in the literature seem
to point at it).
Returning to our two main triggers (increased value of staying in power, and
increased likelihood of a challenge) we conclude that they both have inherently
ambiguous e⁄ects on non-resource GDP. In particular, each of them has indi-
vidually the potential of pushing the leader￿ s investment in pro-growth policies
either down or up. Clearly, then, when both e⁄ects are taken together the am-
biguity increases exponentially. We argue that the key unknown in generating
this ambiguity is the shape of the reduced-form function that links resource
abundance, self-preserving unproductive spending, and pro-growth productive
investments by the leader. In other words we need to know how responsive is
the supply of challengers to changes in resource revenue, and how e⁄ective is
government pro-growth spending at keeping that supply down. Furthermore,
we need to know how e⁄ective is self-preserving expenditure (particularly re-
pression) in sti￿ ing opposition. The net e⁄ect of the mechanisms we emphasize
will depend on these elasticities and how they vary with the level of resource
revenues and other country characteristics.
Our main focus in this paper is on centralized (leader￿ s behavior) mechan-
isms, which seem to have received relatively less attention so far. However, we
make some comments on decentralized responses as well. Decentralized mech-
anisms are essentially rent seeking stories. Resource rents directly change the
incentive structure for private individuals, causing them to reallocate e⁄ort from
productive to unproductive activities. As is well known, rent seeking can gen-
erate a resource curse only if the productive sector operates under increasing
3One mechanism we don￿ t discuss in detail is that potential rebels ￿nd it easier to pledge
future natural resource revenues to their ￿nancial backers than to pledge future tax receipts
from the non-resource sector, as seems famously to have been important in Laurant Kabila￿ s
rebellion in (then) Zaire.
4It may be worth mentioning the positive e⁄ect of resource wealth predicted by the Solow
growth model. In this model poor countries are generally represented as slowly converging,
through accumulation of capital, upwards towards their steady-state levels of wealth. A coun-
try experiencing an isolated windfall should therefore experience a large permanent positive
wealth e⁄ect, but, as a side-e⁄ect, a lower subsequent rate of growth.
4returns to scale, or if the rent-seeking activity has direct negative spillovers on
the productivity of the productive sector. We highlight some open issues with
rent-seeking mechanisms. Among these, establishing that the externalities exist
and are of su¢ cient size; and explaining how externalities can exist without
creating scale e⁄ects, i.e. falsely predicting that smaller countries will be less
wealthy. Most important, however, may be to explain why no actor (particu-
larly the state) can internalize or contract around the externalities. Rent seeking
models rely on some form of market failure, which the state has failed to pre-
vent. What makes the state unable or unwilling to do so? It seems that this
brings us back to the importance of centralized explanations.
When assessing the various potential mechanisms for a curse we are mostly
motivated by the cases of the mineral-rich countries, including of course oil.
Some commentators have occasionally included cash crops as a possible source
of a resource curse. Whether windfalls in the form of price increases for cash
crops seem in some instances to have reduced overall living standards is an
empirical matter that we view as not settled. However, the mechanisms we
highlight below may potentially explain such an outcome, at least in the short
run. In particular, if the physical output of the cash crop sector is fairly inelastic
to taxation, a large increase in the price of cash crops may directly lead to a large
expansion in the resources controlled by the government. A similarly cautious
assessment applies to foreign aid.
2 How to Turn a Blessing into a Curse
Our premise in this paper is that in order to be properly described as a curse,
natural-resource abundance must lower living standards for the average person.
Leaping as usual from living standards to average income, the problem is the
following. Consider an economy that is made up of a resource sector and a
non-resource sector. The value-added of the resource sector is ￿, while the
value-added of the non-resource sector is ￿. Hence, GDP y is
y = ￿ + ￿: (1)




Put another way, we say that there is a curse if an increase in natural-resource
income causes a more than proportional decline in non-natural-resource activity,
d￿=d￿ < ￿1.5
5There is actually a bit of a problem with averages here. We would also say that there is
a curse if natural resouces increase average income, but reduce the income of a large majority
of the population. So perhaps a more relevant requirement for a curse is that it lowers living
standards for the median individual. Our discussion below focuses on the more stringent
criterion of average income, but future work should tackle distributional e⁄ects more explicitly.
5Note that this de￿nition implicitly treats natural-resource GDP, ￿, as exo-
genous. This assumption deserves some comment. In most of the developing
world natural-resource extraction and commercialization takes place under one
of two typical arrangements. The ￿rst arrangement is that the government is-
sues a concession to a foreign company to extract and sell. The ￿ ow of royalties
for the concession is, as a ￿rst approximation, in the short run and in ￿normal￿
circumstances, a proportion of the value of sales, and can therefore reasonably
be treated as exogenous. In the long run, however, the share of the home coun-
try in sales revenues is the result of negotiations between the government and
its foreign counterpart, and will depend both on the bargaining power and on
the incentives of the country￿ s leadership to secure a favorable deal. It is not
di¢ cult to see that both bargaining power and incentives may depend on the
form of government and on the leaders￿accountability. Furthermore, they will
change as the volume of known reserves and/or their market price change, so
one e⁄ect of resource windfalls may well be to induce the government to rene-
gotiate or even revoke existing agreements, with possible knock-on e⁄ects on
the political equilibrium, and further feedbacks onto the relationship with the
foreign companies. Some of these scenarios have recently been playing out in,
e.g., Russia and Bolivia.
The alternative common arrangement is one where the resource-rich coun-
try exploits its reserves through a government owned company.6 The e¢ ciency
and transparency with which the state-owned resource-extraction corporation
operates, as well as its access to capital, freedom to retain pro￿ts for the pur-
pose of reinvestment, economic- vs. patronage-driven nature of its personnel
policy, and the very decision to opt for this form of extraction instead of giving
concessions to foreign companies are all in￿ uenced by the political equilibrium.
Since in turn the political equilibrium is likely a⁄ected by resource windfalls,
we conclude that a potentially important channel of causation from windfalls to
economic outcomes is through the type of arrangement for collecting resource
revenues chosen by the government and through its ability and incentives to
make the most of them. As far as we are aware, however, there has been very
little work on this particular issue.7
Another complicated conceptual issue is whether ￿ should be treated as GDP
to start with. Let￿ s take an unrealistic but useful extreme case for the sake of
argument. Imagine that the extraction and commercialization process uses no
capital and no labour whatsoever. Is it correct to treat the sale on the world
market of some of these resources as value added? An alternative view is that
the total amount of resources available to the country represents an asset, and a
sale of some or all of these resources is just a portfolio reallocation, from, say, oil,
into (foreign) currency. When extraction is costly, perhaps the sales revenues
should be netted out of their purely portfolio component before being added to
GDP. In sum, the conceptually correct way of treating resource revenue from a
6Of course we are focusing on the two corner solutions. In reality the typical case features
a combination of the two forms of exploitation as well as joint ventures between state-owned
and foreign companies.
7Ross (1999). There is more data on ownership in Jones-Luong and Weinthal (2006).
6theoretical standpoint is not fully clear to us. There is an interesting literature
on ￿ genuine saving￿that relates to this (e.g., Hamilton and Clemens (1999)),
but overall perhaps this is another area that deserves more attention.8
Having dutifully put in our plug for more work on these two issues, we set
them aside and return to equations (1) and (2). As mentioned in the intro-
duction, a number of political mechanisms have been proposed that have the
potential of generating a resource curse as de￿ned above. We classify these
mechanisms into two broad classes: centralized mechanisms and decentralized
mechanisms. Centralized explanations for the resource curse focus on the choices
of the country￿ s leaders, while decentralized ones focus on the responses to a
windfall by a (potentially large) number of agents who are not necessarily part
of the governing elite. We begin with the former set of explanations.
3 Centralized Mechanisms
Explanations for the resource curse that focus on the behavior of leaders tend
to share the following two basic features.
First, non-resource GDP depends in part on some inputs provided by the
leader, broadly construed as the political elite. The obvious example is the
provision of public goods, such as law and contract enforcement, infrastructure,
and possibly health and education. When public provision of these inputs falls
the non-resource sector becomes less productive and less e¢ cient. Private in-
vestments may also decline in response. In order to provide these productive
inputs to the non-resource sector the leader must spent some of the government
revenues on them. In addition, e⁄ective government spending on public goods
may depend on investments of the leader￿ s time and e⁄ort. Hence, a ￿central-
ized￿political resource curse occurs if an increase in resource revenues causes
the leadership to reduce its investments of money or e⁄ort in productive public
good provision to such a large extent that the non-resource sector shrinks by
more than the resource sector expands.
Formally, we have
￿ = ￿(i;l) ￿ f(i;l) ￿ i;
where i is government spending, l is leader￿ s e⁄ort in providing public goods, and
f(i;l) is private-sector GDP. We assume that f(i;l) is neoclassical and obeys











8A more mundane, but nonetheless important issue is whether we should be concerned with
GDP or GNP. Seen from the point of view of the resource sector the appropriate measure seems
clearly to be GNP, as the share of the value of sales accruing to foreign companies is both
large and irrelevant for the purposes of domestic e¢ ciency and welfare. However from the
point of view of the non-resource sector most of the mechanism for a resource curse operate
through a weakening of this sector￿ s productive capacity, so it seems more natural to focus on
GDP.
7Second, the leader is self-interested. In choosing i and l the leader maximizes
his own utility, and this is not always achieved by maximizing aggregate GDP.
This maximization problem faces the following budget constraint:
c = ￿ + ￿f(i;l) ￿ i;
where ￿ is the tax rate on the private sector. Hence the revenue accruing to
the government from natural resources is an essentially inelastic endowment-like
￿ ow. Instead, the government cannot capture all of the private GDP because
taxing private GDP has distortionary e⁄ects. In particular, non-resource tax-
revenue is subject to the usual ￿La⁄er curve￿e⁄ect, as it depends in part on the
incentives of agents other than the dictator to exert e⁄ort and invest. In what
follows we take the tax rate ￿ as exogenous for simplicity, and because it does
not play an important role.9 The government budget also takes into account
spending on public goods.
Given the budget constraint above a consumption-maximising leader will
under-invest: the GDP maximizing condition for i is df=di = 1, while the leader￿ s
revenue maximizing condition is ￿df=di = 1, meaning that he will cease investing
before reaching the e¢ cient level, i.e. the level at which the marginal product
of investment is equal to its cost. However so far we have not introduced any
mechanism which can explain a decrease in investment following a resource
windfall, the following sections go on to do that.
3.1 A Simple Reduced-Form Framework
In order to discuss possible causal mechanisms linking a change in resource
revenue ￿ with changes in resources i spent by the leader on activities that
enhance the productivity of the private sector we found it useful to develop the
following simple two-period framework.10 In the ￿rst period, the leader begins
by collecting an exogenous ￿ ow of revenue ￿. He then proceeds to allocate
this revenue between own ￿rst-period consumption, c1, pro-growth investments,
i, and self-preserving activities, b. For the time being we interpret the latter
as pure repression, though later we will explore the extent to which b can be
reinterpreted as patronage.
9The reader who is unhappy about this may become slightly happier by thinking about
the following version of the model. The production function is
￿ = ￿(i;l;￿);
with ￿3 negative; and government revenue is
T = ￿ + ￿￿(i;l;￿):
Cursory calculations suggest that in our various models below this version gives qualitatively
identical results to the ones in the main text.
10A referee has pointed out that in this dynamic game the La⁄er-curve justi￿cation of our
tax rate may not apply, because in the ￿nal period the leader will have no reason not to set
the tax rate at 100%. So, in lieu of a more sophisticated dynamic model, we assume that the
leader can commit to a tax rate in advance.
8The key assumption is that the leader faces some probability of losing power.
In particular, the leader will still be in power in the second period only with
probability ￿. If he does hold on to power, he collects once again ￿. Further-
more, he collects a fraction ￿ < 1 of private sector income, f(i). We assume
that the tax rate on private income is less than 1 to account for (without expli-
citly modelling) the distortionary potential of such taxes. The tax rate ￿ can
be thought of the tax-revenue maximizing tax rate. Private-sector GDP is a
function of i because i re￿ ects the provision of public inputs (such as infrastruc-
ture, or the rule of law) that increase productivity. Second-period consumption
by the leader is c2 = ￿ + ￿f(i). Without loss of generality we assume that
the leader does not discount the future (other than through the probability of
staying in o¢ ce).
The properties of the model will crucially depend on what we assume about
￿. First, ￿ is likely to depend negatively on ￿. This is because an increase in ￿
increases the value of being in power, thus emboldening potential challengers.
More, or more aggressive, challengers clearly spell danger for the leader of period
1. Second, ￿ will depend positively on repressive spending, b. Clearly the more
powerful the security apparatus the safer the leader￿ s position. Third, ￿ depends
on i. This works again through the potential challengers￿incentives. Potential
challengers￿ outside option is to be active in the private sector, perhaps as
entrepreneurs. The more productive the private sector, the better the outside
option, the lower the likelihood that a challenge will be cast. Hence, for the most
part we assume that ￿ is increasing in i.11 In sum, we can write ￿(b;i;￿), where
the semicolon separates variables that depend on the leader￿ s decisions from
variables that are exogenous inputs to that decision. The model is summarized
in the following simple time-line.
Period 1 Period 2
￿ (i;b) c1 = ￿ ￿ i ￿ b ￿(￿;i;b) ￿;f(i) c2 = ￿ + ￿f(i)
3.2 The Busy Leader
First, suppose that ￿ depends on the e⁄ort put in to maintain power, and that
the dictator has only a ￿xed supply of e⁄ort that they can supply, which they
allocate between maintaining power and overseeing non-resource development.
If we represent development e⁄ort as i, and survival e⁄ort as (1￿i), the objective
function will now look like:




= ￿￿0(1 ￿ i)[￿ + ￿￿(i)] + ￿0(1 ￿ i)￿￿0(i) = 0
11An increase in private-sector productivity will also make it more expensive for potential
challengers to recruit supporters.
9Faced with this trade-o⁄the dictator will always lower e⁄ort in non-resource
development when ￿ increases, though total second-period output could be










￿ (￿￿00 + ￿00￿ ￿ 2￿0￿0) + ￿￿00 ? ￿1
If f and ￿ are both linear then a curse will occur if and only if ￿ is less than
1/2.
Clearly this model is missing the important fact that labour and capital are
substitutes in production, which allows the dictator to supply more capital to
make up for the missing labour. To justify this simple model the ruler￿ s labour
and capital must be close to perfect complements in production. Or in other
words, the ruler must be unable to delegate any of their oversight power to
intermediaries. This interpretation has some plausibility: in countries without
a strong rule of law, but with a strong incentive to contest power, delegation is
very di¢ cult; this ￿ts with the frequently observed re-arrangement of political
positions in dictatorial countries.
It is common in political science literature to say that a resource windfall
"distracts" a state from tasks that are important for economic development,
such as investment or tax collection.12 Ross (1999, p313) criticizes this line
of thought because of its assumption "that states are revenue satis￿cers, not
revenue maximizers." However the model given here could explain a rational
neglect of activities as due to the inability to delegate. Another model presented
below, the "lazy leader," gives a similar way of rationalizing the description of
leaders as distracted.
3.3 The Repressive Leader
Next we consider the case in which the probability of regime survival (￿) depends
upon repressive spending by the dictator (b). This could be interpreted as
spending on the military or on secret police. Other interpretations of b, as well
as other mechanisms involving b, are discussed in a later section. The objective
function now becomes:
u = ￿ ￿ i ￿ b + ￿(b)[￿ + ￿￿(i)];
with ￿rst-order conditions:
￿0(b)(￿ + ￿￿(i)) = 1
￿(b)￿￿0(i) = 1
12For example, Birdsall & Subramanian (2004): "[a resource-rich] state is relieved of the
pressure to tax and has no incentive to promote the protection of property rights as a way of
creating wealth." See Ross (1999) for more examples.
10Which gives us:
db[￿00(￿ + ￿￿)] + d￿[￿0] + di[￿0￿￿0] = 0
db[￿0￿￿0] + di[￿￿￿00] = 0
di=d￿ =
￿￿0￿0￿￿0
(￿0￿￿0)2 ￿ ￿00(￿ + ￿￿)￿￿￿00
where the second-order condition is:
u11u22 ￿ u2
12 = ￿00[￿ + ￿￿]￿￿￿00 ￿ (￿￿0￿0)2 ￿ 0
If the second-order condition is satis￿ed then the e⁄ect of resources on in-
vestment (di=d￿) is non-negative, thus there can be no curse. Intuitively, a
windfall raises the returns to b, and because b and i are complements, spending
on both increases. So, of two dictators, the one with the larger windfall will
employ a larger political police force, because of the greater returns to keeping
power; that dictator will also invest more, because they now have a greater
probability of keeping power.
A curse can occur if we add to this model a budget constraint in the ￿rst
period. When it binds ￿rst-period revenue will be divided between spending on
investment and on repression, so that b = ￿ ￿ i, and the objective function can
now be written:
u = ￿(￿ ￿ i)[￿ + ￿f(i)]
With ￿rst-order condition, total di⁄erential, and comparative statics:
￿￿0(￿ + ￿f) + ￿￿f0 = 0
da[￿￿00(￿ + ￿f) ￿ ￿0 + ￿0￿f0] + di[￿00(￿ + ￿f) ￿ ￿0￿f0 ￿ ￿0￿f0 + ￿￿f00] = 0
di=d￿ =
￿00(￿ + ￿f) + ￿0 ￿ ￿0￿f0
￿00(￿ + ￿f) ￿ 2￿0￿f0 + ￿￿f00
The ￿nal expression has an ambiguous sign: resource windfall raises the
returns to repression (b), encouraging substitution away from investment, but
it also has a positive income e⁄ect on investment (i). A curse can occur if, for
example, ￿(x) = Ax and f(x) = Bx, in which case di=d￿ = (￿AB ￿ A)=2￿AB,
which produces a curse i⁄ ￿B ￿ 1
3.
If the windfall was only an anticipated windfall, so that ￿ appeared only in
the period-2 payo⁄, not in the constraint, then the income e⁄ect would disap-
pear, and an increase in windfall would unambiguously decrease investment.
An interpretation of these results is that, as in the previous model, the leader
must be under some kind of constraint in order for resource income to crowd
out productive investment.
11Note that this model has the potential of generating a non-monotonic rela-
tion between resource income and non-resource investment. At low levels of ￿
the leader is constrained, and di=d￿ may be negative. At some point ￿ becomes
large enough for the leader to be able to implement the interior solution, and
from then on di=d￿ > 0.
Empirically, there seems to be a robust positive association between resource
income and dictatorship (Ross, 2001), perhaps supporting a link between wind-
fall and spending on repression.
3.4 The Strategic Leader
Next we consider the case in which the probability of regime survival increases
with investment. This can be seen as a dictator winning support from a pop-
ulation through paying for economic development. The objective function is
now:
u = ￿ ￿ i + ￿(i)[￿ + ￿￿(i)];
with ￿rst-order conditions:




By the second order condition, the second term in brackets is non-positive,
so di=d￿ must be non-negative, so there cannot be a curse. The e⁄ect is very
similar to that in the previous model: higher ￿ raises the returns to investment
through ￿, which in turns raises the returns to investment through ￿.
These same equations have another opposite interpretation. The probability
of survival could be decreasing, instead of increasing, in investment (￿0 < 0). If
economic development bene￿ts not just the state, but other groups also (such as
rebel guerillas, landholders, the middle class, or foreign ￿rms) then the state may
decrease investment in order to maintain its power. In this interpretation, the
equations are identical to those above, except that now ￿0(i) < 0, so di=d￿ must
now be non-positive, i.e. investment is decreasing with windfalls, and there could
be a curse. In short, this story says that dictators only ever invest reluctantly,
because they fear the power that development gives to their rivals; with resource
income they shut down other investment, starving o⁄ their challengers, and live
comfortably o⁄ their resource wealth.
This theory of the curse may ￿nd some support in evidence that resource-
rich countries tend to have less open economies (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004;
Auty, 2001; Auty, 1994; Mahon, 1992). Sachs and Warner (1995) con￿rm this
association, but claim that it explains little of the curse e⁄ect. Acemoglu et al.
(2004) explicitly argue that states intentionally prevent development because
of fear of losing power. Dunning (2005) gives some conditions under which the
12elite fail to invest in diversi￿cation, for fear that it will raise the probability of a
revolt, and applies this model to the facts of Zaire￿ s development, saying ￿[t]he
high degree of societal opposition to Mobutu in Zaire led him to believe that
investments in infrastructure and other public goods would pose a threat to his
grip on political power￿(p. 453). If Zaire had not had resource income, perhaps
Mobutu would have risked his power more by investing in public goods.
3.5 The Fatalistic Leader
A ￿nal single-variable version of the survival function is ￿(￿), with ￿0(￿) <
0, meaning that increasing resource income lowers the probability of regime
survival. This can be easily justi￿ed with a model of the decision-making of
potential political challengers (rebels, opposition parties, or coup leaders) whose
incentive to challenge power increases with ￿. The dictator￿ s problem is now:
u = ￿ ￿ i + ￿(￿)(￿ + ￿(i))
Here investment unambiguously decreases with ￿, because high resources
raise the e⁄ective discount rate, and so lower the return to investment. The net
e⁄ect of resources is given by
df=d￿ = 1 ￿
￿0￿0￿0
￿￿00 ;
which says a curse is more likely if the returns to investment are fairly steep
and straight. If ￿(a) = 1￿a, and f(i) = Aln(i), then df=da = 1￿ A
1￿￿. In this
case the curse is increasing in the rate of return on investment.
The central assumption of this theory, that ￿ is decreasing in ￿, has mixed
evidence. Smith (2004) ￿nds that oil exporters tend to have longer-lived govern-
ments. On the other hand Nigeria has had 8 successful coups since independence
in 1960, and it seems likely that Nigeria￿ s oil revenues have contributed some-
thing towards the incentives of potential coup leaders.
On investment, Gylfason and Zoega (2006) have argued that productive in-
vestment is low in resource dependent countries, though investment may be
nominally high. It appears that many resource-rich countries have undertaken
large long-term investment projects, and apparently with little success. Gelb
(1988) has a detailed study of how six oil producers spent their windfall income
in the 1970s, compared to carefully constructed counterfactuals, and ￿nds ￿the
six countries used the windfalls largely for domestic investment in the public
sector, rather than to increase consumption or to acquire foreign assets.￿Pos-
sibly the public sector investments were poor choices, nevertheless this behavior
is not immediately consistent with a model predicting a high discount factor.
3.6 Sketch of a ￿(￿;b;i) Model
Caselli (2006) presents a simple model that combines several of the main e⁄ects
discussed above. The model studies the strategic interaction between a leader
13in power and a potential coup leader. The potential coup leader compares the
expected return from a coup with the return from becoming an entrepreneur in
the private sector. The expected return from a coup takes the form (1￿P)V p(￿),
where V p(￿) is the value of being in power, and is increasing in the resource ￿ ow
to the elite.13 This is discounted by P, which is the probability that the coup
will fail. The expected return from becoming an entrepreneur, V e, is increasing
in the productivity of the private sector, V e(i). Hence, there exists a threshold
level of investment, ￿ {(￿;P), such that a coup occurs if and only if i < ￿ {(￿;P).
This implies that as ￿ increases the productive investment needed of the leader
to forestall a coup increases, i.e. more revenue makes self-preservation through
development more expensive.
As in the models above, the leader decides how to allocate ￿rst-period re-
source revenues between ￿rst-period consumption, investment, and repressive
activities. Repressive activities increase the probability of coup failure (con-
ditional on a coup taking place), or P = P(b). Technologies are linear. In
particular, f(i) = ￿i, with ￿￿ > 1. The latter parametric assumption implies
that if the leader expects no coup (or expects all coups to be crushed with prob-
ability 1), it invests all of the ￿rst period resource revenue in the pro-growth
activity. However, if it expects a coup, and the probability of coup success is
large enough, it invests nothing in the activity.14 The repressive technology is
of the form P = min(￿b;1), which implies that if the leader can throw enough
resources into repression it can successfully face down any challenge.
Under certain additional parametric assumptions the equilibrium of this
model is described by the following ￿gure. There are three regions for ￿. For
￿ <￿ the leader ploughs all of his resource income into the private economy.
Increases in ￿ increase the incentives of coup leaders to stage a coup, but not
by enough to push i below ￿ {(￿;0). Since there is no coup, there is no need for
wasting resources on counter-insurgency, and b = P = 0.
When ￿ is just above ￿, in the absence of counter-insurgency spending a coup
will take place and succeed. Hence i = ￿, b = 0 can no longer be the optimal
policy for the leader. The ￿gure is drawn for the case where P(￿)￿￿ < 1, i.e.
when the leader faces a return to investment which is less than the opportunity
cost even if it invests all of ￿ into counter-insurgency. Hence, in this region the
leader invests all of his resource revenue in counterinsurgency.
Finally, the last region is de￿ned by ￿ > ￿￿, where ￿￿ is de￿ned by P(￿￿) =
1. With the possibility of a coup, completely eliminated, the leader returns to
pro-growth investments. Details aside, this model con￿rms that when several
13To be more precise the value of being in power also increases in the leader￿ s ￿rst period
investment, i, or V p(￿;i). This is because an increase in i increases tax revenues from the
non-resource sector. Under mild assumptions, however, the e⁄ect of i on the opportunity
cost of a coup is stronger than its e⁄ect on the attractiveness of a coup, so for simplicity we
abstract from this complication in this discussion. See Caselli (2006) for details.
14The investment function is
i =
￿
0 if no coup or P￿￿ < 1
￿ if coup and P￿￿ ￿ 1
14of the mechanisms discussed above are put together, the relationship between
GDP and resource revenue can become very non-monotonic. In this particular
case, more resources are unquestionably a blessing at low levels of ￿, they are
a curse (both political and economic) at intermediate levels, and a quali￿ed





Patronage, particularly interpreted as buying votes or buying political support,
is often mentioned in connection with resource-rich economies.
At ￿rst sight patronage serves the same role in the dictator￿ s choice situation
as does spending on repression: money that increases the probability of keeping
power. As discussed under that heading, such spending can only crowd out
investment if the leader faces a binding budget constraint.
Another way of representing the relationship between patronage and invest-
ment decisions is as alternative ways of getting support: either through funding
public services, or through directly buying votes.
To represent this in the general model we allow ￿ to be a function of both
15i and p. For simplicity we drop the budget constraint and set ￿ = 0. In this
model, if ￿(i;p) is continuous and weakly concave, patronage cannot crowd out
investment. In order to generate a curse the model must incorporate some
discontinuity or non-complementarity between the two inputs.
A simple way this may be true is if there are increasing returns to patronage.
For example if a dictator has to bribe the entire judiciary to steal an election,
this may not be feasible for low levels of income (in which case the dictator
uses investment to win support), but it is feasible for high levels (in which case
the dictator neglects public services). Collier (2007, p.45) argues that poor
democracies, when given income from resource exports, tend to substitute from
investment to patronage.15 Humphreys and Bates (2005) argue that resource-
rich countries will tend to use more patronage than investment, just because the
provision of public goods is relatively more expensive, due to the inelasticity with
respect to taxation that they exhibit.
Patronage models are interesting and clearly have a ring of truth to them.
From a theoretical point of view the main unanswered question is why the
promises exchanged by the patron and the recipients of patronage are mutually
credible. Why do the recipient reward patronage with his or her vote after
having received it? Or, if the vote is given in exchange for promised future
patronage, why can￿ t other politicians promise the same? Robinson, Torvik and
Verdier (2006) make some progress on these questions, but the puzzle remains.
3.8 The Lazy Leader
We now move to a model in which the ￿ function does not play a role, this in-
volves a static trade-o⁄between the dictator￿ s leisure and time spent overseeing
development. This serves as an alternative formalization of the idea, mentioned
above, that dictators reliant on abundant natural resources ￿do not need￿to
worry about developing the economy. The non-resource production function is
now more sophisticated:
￿ = ￿(l;i);
where l is the time and energy the dictator devotes to governing the country
and i is the amount of resource-revenue invested by the dictator in non-resource
activities. For example, besides money being invested in public infrastructure,
the non-resource sector may also require careful management of the that money
so as to avoid waste and theft and identify the most pro￿table projects. We
assume that ￿ is neoclassical.
The dictator cares about his own consumption (c) and leisure (1 ￿ l) only,
i.e. he maximizes
u(c;1 ￿ l);
which has the usual properties.
15Another interesting argument o⁄ered by Collier is that increased resource income attracts
lower-quality politicians to o¢ ce, who in turn are less inclined to provide public services. It
may be possible to embed this argument in Caselli and Morelli￿ s (2004) model of self-selection
by quality in political life.
16So the objective function is now:
u(￿ + ￿￿(l;i);1 ￿ l)
In this model, both l and i (and hence ￿) are decreasing in ￿. Put di⁄erently,
an increase in resource income leads to a decline in non-resource income. The
intuition is of course that resource revenue has a wealth e⁄ect that induces
the dictator to wish to consume more leisure. If investment and e⁄ort are
complementary, investment will also fall, possibly leading to a curse. This is
because any increase in resource revenue is associated with a one-for-one increase
in the dictator￿ s income, while a decline in non-resource revenue only leads to a
￿ < 1 fall in the dictator￿ s income. Hence, it is possible for aggregate income to
fall while the dictator￿ s income increases, thus preserving the negative wealth
e⁄ect on e⁄ort.
At ￿rst sight the lazy dictator model seems a bit silly, with these dictators
trading o⁄ leisure with consumption, as if they were assembly-line workers.
Taken slightly less literally, however, the lazy dictator theory is one where the
ruling elite (and the top brass of the army) have virtually costless access to
immense wealth. They can therefore ￿nance a lavish lifestyle without having
to pay particularly close attention to how the rest of society is faring. That
immense personal riches may sap a ruling elite￿ s interest and willingness to
promote wealth in the rest of the economy is not entirely implausible. Certainly
anecdotal examples in which the inner circle of the dictator ends up almost
completely out of touch with the rest of society abound. Still, it is not as if
absolute rulers of resource-poor countries are exactly indigent. The model does
assume that the wealth e⁄ect is still operational at levels of wealth that are
fantastic for most people: $1bn makes you lazy, but not $100m. The earlier
points about the costs of delegation also apply here.
Whether realistic or not, that the elite values leisure and that the elite￿ s
e⁄ort is an important input in non-resource GDP are critical to tell stories for
the resource curse which are based on the idea that the elite does not need
growth in non-resource GDP to get rich. If we replace ￿(l;i) with ￿(i), or u(c;l)
with u(c), or both, then both the equilibrium value of i and the equilibrium
value of ￿ are independent of ￿.16 The intuition of course is that if the leader￿ s
e⁄ort is constant (or does not matter) the optimal amount of natural resource
revenue invested for non-resource development depends exclusively on the rate
of return of this investment. In this case, non-resource GDP cannot be declining
with natural resource revenue, and GDP must increase.
3.9 Centralized Mechanisms: Summing Up
A very simple reduced-form model of leadership in a resource abundant country
generates a wealth of possible mechanisms, some of which imply that resources
are a blessing, others that they are a curse. In order to get a curse it is necessary
16More precisely, the interior equilibrium level of i; which is determined by the condition
￿0(i) = 1. If this level of investment exceeds ￿ then i = ￿.
17that government provided inputs to the non-resource sector fall, and that the
magnitude of the fall or the elasticity of non-resource GDP to government-
provided inputs be very large.
Whether government-provided inputs will fall in response to a resource wind-
fall, and by how much, depends crucially on the shape of the leader￿ s survival
function, the object we call ￿. Di⁄erent combinations of elasticities of ￿ to
its arguments can lead to utterly di⁄erent predictions. Furthermore, if these
elasticities change for di⁄erent values of the arguments, it is relatively easy to
get signi￿cant non-monotonicities in the response of government-provided in-
puts to changes in the resource base. We can summarise the ￿ndings as follows,
organised according to how a windfall changes incentives:
Increasing the incentive to maintain power. This can cause substitution
away from investment and towards activities which raise the probability
of survival. This channel can only work if the leader operates under a
constraint, either on time (busy leader) or on money (repressive leader).
Decreasing the probability of survival. A windfall can induce more com-
petition for power, causing a lower probability of survival, and so lowering
the expected returns to investment (fatalistic leader).
Lowering dependence on non-resource sectors. If the main motivation for
investment by leaders is to keep their citizens satis￿ed then a windfall
could make available alternative means to keep power, such as repression
or patronage. If the alternative instrument is a substitute, instead of a
complement, then a windfall can cause a drop in investment (strategic
leader, and section 3.7 on patronage).
Lowering the value of money. Finally, a windfall could, through a wealth
e⁄ect, cause substitution away from time spent overseeing investment (lazy
leader).
In order to make progress it is essential to learn more about the function ￿. A
￿rst step is obviously to unpack ￿ into its two components: the probability that
the leader will face a challenge, and the probability, conditional on a challenge
being launched, of surviving it. The former requires explicit modelling of other
actors in society, particularly those who have the personal qualities that make
them potential political leaders. This is likely to be a small minority in the
population (though the current leader may have di¢ culties in identifying them).
Hence, it seems appropriate to focus on games with a ￿nite number of players.
The latter is mostly a technological relation between investments in repression
and the e⁄ectiveness of such investments. It is mostly an empirical issue, though
it is possible to think of theoretical mechanisms that determine this e⁄ectiveness
and its variation across countries. In countries with a lot of forest cover, for
example, counter-insurgency spending is probably much less e⁄ective.
Another elaboration of this structure would model in more detail the compet-
ition for power between groups within the elite. The competition can produce
18an incentive for the incumbent to keep political institutions weak, which may as
a side-e⁄ect keep market institutions weak. We think that the mechanics of such
models will ￿t within our structure, interpreting investment as institutions, but
more detailed discussions are contained in, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2004),
Padr￿ i Miquel (2007), and Besley and Kudumatsu (2007).
4 Decentralized Mechanisms
Decentralized approaches to the resource curse focus on the actions of agents
outside the ruling circle. Broadly speaking, they emphasize the dependence of
non-resource GDP on productive investment, x, and labour supply, s by the
citizens, rather than by the ruler. Hence,
￿ = ￿(x;s);
and a resource curse emerges if x and s decline in response to an increase in
￿ so that ￿ falls more than proportionally. In the political-economy literature,
the main reason o⁄ered for this decline in private investments is rent seeking.
4.1 Basic Rent Seeking Model
The basic structure of rent seeking models is that individuals make a choice
between working in the productive private sector or engaging in competition
to appropriate part of the resource revenue. Suppose, then, that there is a
continuum of individuals of mass 1. Abstracting for the time being from physical
inputs, assume that if engaged in the productive activity individuals earn ￿,
while those who rent seek divide equally among themselves the resource ￿. At





The condition then says that the marginal ￿non-rent-seeker￿is just indi⁄erent
between the two occupations.
With constant returns to scale (i.e. if ￿ a constant), this model clearly has no
trouble generating a fall in s in response to an increase in ￿. Non-resource GDP
will thus fall. But aggregate GDP will not. In fact, aggregate GDP is always ￿,
independent of ￿.17 Hence, the model features full resource dissipation through
rent seeking but no resource curse. This is of course an immediate consequence
that the-private sector production function featuring constant returns to scale.18
To get a resource curse we need to assume that ￿0 is increasing in s. If
￿00(s) > 0 then an increase in ￿ will bring about a decline in aggregate GDP. This
17To check the result note that GDP is ￿+￿s. Plugging in ￿ from (3) the result is immediate.
18The complete-dissipation case is a special case in general rent-seeking models, and the
more typical case is one of under-dissipation, which makes a resource curse even harder to
generate. See Nitzan et al. (1993) for a discussion on how dissipation rates depend on
modelling assumptions.
19is essentially the model of Torvik (2002). One way to motivate the assumption
is that there are increasing returns to scale in the non-resource sector. In this
sense the rent-seeking model is reminiscent of classic Dutch disease arguments,
where it was assumed that the non-resource sectors enjoyed externalities (or
learning by doing) unavailable to the resource sector. Such externalities are
currently de-emphasized in the macroeconomics literature, largely because they
have proved very hard to document empirically. In addition, admitting that
there are important externalities in private-sector activity seems to open the
door to signi￿cant size e⁄ects in GDP. Since larger countries don￿ t seem to be
richer, this may be a problem.
Alternatively one could interpret the assumption ￿00(s) > 0 to mean that
there are negative externalities from rent seeking to private production. Whether
or not this is a plausible assumption depends on the speci￿c interpretation one
gives to rent seeking.
4.2 Roadblocks
A simple model of rent seeking that naturally generates negative externalities on
the non-resource sector is one where the rent seeking activity consists of setting
up road blocks aimed at extorting money from passing vehicles. An increase in
resource income can increase the attractiveness of setting up roadblocks relative
to employment in the non-resource sector, if resource income can be extracted
from passing vehicles. A negative externality on the non-resource sector can then
result, if the extortion tax levied by the roadblocks induces those who remain
in the non-resource sector to reduce their e⁄ort and/or their investments.
The story has logical and anecdotal appeal. However, it is somewhat in-
complete. Resource revenue does not spread itself equally in the population: it
tends to ￿ ow mostly to the elite. It seems likely that the elite will have means to
protect itself against this sort of predation. If so, however, the incentives to start
the road blocks diminish considerably. More generally, one would expect the
state to be able to internalize the negative spillovers generated by rent seeking.
Any model of rent seeking needs to explain why the central government cannot
or chooses not to control the spillover-generating activity.19 Hence, a fully com-
pelling model of rent seeking needs to explicitly model the leader￿ s behavior. In
other words, there is no such thing as a fully decentralized explanation.
4.3 Civil War
One type of rent-seeking activity that is sure to have negative externalities on
the non-resource sector is civil war. In countries ravaged by civil war the return
to investment and productive e⁄ort are clearly severely curtailed. However it
is doubtful that a model featuring such an extreme degree of decentralization
as the one on hand can be thought of as a good model of civil war. For one
19Failure to control these externalities could be considered as lack of investment, i, as
modelled above.
20thing, the government is usually a major player in civil wars. Second, civil-
war situations present enormous incentives to create coalitions, as witnessed by
the fact that most civil wars are fought by just two main groupings. Given
the likely involvement of the government, and given the coalition-formation
questions raised by civil war, models of civil war are perhaps better though of
as ￿semi-decentralized.￿
An important question in modelling civil war is the nature and robustness of
the coalitions that form in order to ￿ght the war. Caselli and Coleman (2006)
point out that members of the losing coalition have overwhelming incentives
to defect to the winner. This way they can regain access to the distribution
of the resource revenue. But this defection is actually a problem for the win-
ner. If unchecked, it implies that the resource income will have to be shared
widely, thereby defeating the very purpose for which the coalition had gone to
war initially. We should therefore expect civil war to be more likely to erupt
if there exist relatively low cost means of policing coalition boundaries. Case-
lli and Coleman suggest that one such means is ethnicity. If coalitions can be
formed along ethnic lines, and ethnicity comes with markers that allow fairly
easy categorization of individuals into groups, then the winning ethnic group
can be quite e⁄ective at preventing in￿ltration by the losers. We would there-
fore expect natural-resource abundance to be more likely to trigger civil war in
ethnically heterogeneous societies.
5 Conclusions
We have tried to advance the view that explicit consideration of the political
elite￿ s incentives and constraints is essential in understanding the e⁄ects of re-
source windfalls. Resource windfalls a⁄ect the political elite￿ s returns from
staying in power, as well as their perception of the likelihood of becoming in-
volved in a power struggle. These considerations are likely to have ￿rst order
e⁄ects on their choices, including the amounts of resources and e⁄ort they de-
vote to increasing the productivity of the non-resource sector. Unfortunately,
however, it is hard at this stage to be con￿dent about the direction, much less
the magnitude, of these changes. They depends on a rich set of elasticities of the
probability of staying in power to its various determinants. It is possible to de-
scribe equally plausible scenarios where resource windfalls are bene￿cial as well
as detrimental. Furthermore, it is relatively easy to generate non-monoticities,
whereby additions to resource income is bene￿cial at certain levels of resources,
and detrimental at others.
6 References
D. Acemoglu, J.A. Robinson, and T. Verdier. Kleptocracy and divide-and-rule:
A model of personal rule. Journal of the European Economic Association,
2(2-3):162￿ 192, 2004.
21R.M. Auty. The political economy of resource-driven growth. European
Economic Review, 45(4-6):839￿ 46, 2001.
R.M. Auty. Industrial policy reform in six large newly industrializing coun-
tries: The resource curse thesis. World Development, 22(1):11￿ 26, 1994.
N. Birdsall and A. Subramanian. Saving Iraq from its oil. Foreign A⁄airs,
83(4):77￿ 89, 2004.
T. Besley and M. Kudamatsu. Making Autocracy Work. CEPR Discussion
Paper No. DP6371. 2007.
F. Caselli. Power struggles and the natural-resource curse. Technical report,
mimeo, London School of Economics, 2006.
F. Caselli and M., Morelli. Bad Politicians. Journal of Public Economics,
88(3-4):759-782, 2004.
F. Caselli and W. J. Coleman II. On the Theory of Ethnic Con￿ ict. NBER
Working Paper No. 12125, 2006.
P. Collier. The Bottom Billion, OUP: New York, 2007.
T. Dunning. Resource dependence, economic performance, and political
stability. Journal of Con￿ict Resolution, 49(4):451, 2005.
A.H. Gelb. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse?, OUP: New York, 1988.
T. Gylfason and G. Zoega. Natural Resources and Economic Growth: The
Role of Investment. The World Economy, 29:1091-1115, 2006.
K. Hamilton and M. Clemens. Genuine savings rates in developing countries.
The World Bank Economic Review, 13(2):333, 1999.
M. Humphreys and R. Bates. Political institutions and economic policies:
Lessons from africa. British Journal of Political Science, 35(03):403￿ 428, 2005.
P. Jones-Luong and E. Weinthal. Rethinking the resource curse: Ownership
structure, institutional capacity, and domestic constraints. Annual Review of
Political Science, 9(1):241￿ 263, 2006.
J. Mahon. Was latin america too rich to prosper? Structural and political
obstacles to export-led industrial growth. Journal of Development Studies,
28(2):241￿ 263, 1992.
S. Nitzan. Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political
Economy, 10:41￿ 60, 1993.
G. Padr￿ i Miquel. The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The
Politics of Fear. Review of Economic Studies, 74(4): 1259-1274, 2007.
E. Papyrakis and R. Gerlagh. The resource curse hypothesis and its trans-
mission channels. Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(1):181￿ 93, 2004.
J.A. Robinson, R. Torvik, and T. Verdier. Political foundations of the
resource curse. Journal of Development Economics, 79(2):447￿ 68, 2006.
M.L. Ross. The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics,
51(2):297￿ 322, 1999.
M.L. Ross. Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53(3):325￿ 61, 2001.
J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner. Natural resource abundance and economic
growth. , mimeo, Harvard Institute for International Development, 1995.
B. Smith. Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960-
1999. American Journal of Political Science, 48:232-246, 2004.
22X. Sala-i Martin and A. Subramanian. Addressing the natural resource
curse: An illustration from Nigeria. NBER Working Paper No. 9804, 2003.
R. Torvik. Natural Resources, Rent Seeking and Welfare. Journal of Devel-
opment Economics, 67:455-70, 2002.
23CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
912 Marco  Manacorda 
Edward Miguel 
Andrea Vigorito 
Government Transfers and Political Support 
911 Philippe  Aghion 
John Van Reenen 
Luigi Zingales 
Innovation and Institutional Ownership 
910  Fabian Waldinger  Peer Effects in Science – Evidence from the 
Dismissal of Scientists in Nazi Germany 
909 Tomer  Blumkin 
Yossi Hadar 
Eran Yashiv 
The Macroeconomic Role of Unemployment 
Compensation 
908 Natalie  Chen 
Dennis Novy 
International Trade Integration: A 
Disaggregated Approach 
907  Dongshu Ou  To Leave or Not to Leave? A Regression 
Discontinuity Analysis of the Impact of Failing 
the High School Exit Exam 
906 Andrew  B.  Bernard 
J. Bradford Jensen 
Stephen J. Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
The Margins of US Trade 
905 Gianluca  Benigno 
Bianca De Paoli 
On the International Dimension of Fiscal 
Policy 
904  Stephen J. Redding  Economic Geography: A Review of the 
Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
903 Andreas  Georgiadis 
Alan Manning 
Change and Continuity Among Minority 
Communities in Britain 
902  Maria Bas  Trade, Technology Adoption and Wage 
Inequalities: Theory and Evidence 
901 Holger  Breinlich 
Chiara Criscuolo 
Service Traders in the UK 
900 Emanuel  Ornelas 
John L. Turner 
Protection and International Sourcing 
899 Kosuke  Aoki 
Takeshi Kimura 
Central Bank's Two-Way Communication with 
the Public and Inflation Dynamics 
898 Alan  Manning 
Farzad Saidi 
Understanding the Gender Pay Gap: What’s 
Competition Got to Do with It? 897  David M. Clark 
Richard Layard 
Rachel Smithies 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapy: 
Initial Evaluation of the Two Demonstration 
Sites 
896  Giorgio Barba Navaretti 
Riccardo Faini 
Alessandra Tucci 
Does Family Control Affect Trade 
Performance? Evidence for Italian Firms 
895  Jang Ping Thia  Why Capital Does Not Migrate to the South: A 
New Economic Geography Perspective 
894 Kristian  Behrens 
Frédéric Robert-Nicoud 
Survival of the Fittest in Cities: 
Agglomeration, Selection and Polarisation 
893 Sharon  Belenzon 
Mark Schankerman 
Motivation and Sorting in Open Source 
Software Innovation 
892 Guy  Michaels 
Ferdinand Rauch 
Stephen J. Redding 
Urbanization and Structural Transformation 




Modern Management: Good for the 
Environment or Just Hot Air? 
890 Paul  Dolan 
Robert Metcalfe 
Comparing willingness-to-pay and subjective 
well- being in the context of non-market goods 
889 Alberto  Galasso 
Mark Schankerman 
Patent Thickets and the Market for Innovation: 
Evidence from Settlement of Patent Disputes 
888  Raffaella Sadun  Does Planning Regulation Protect Independent 
Retailers? 
887 Bernardo  Guimaraes 
Kevin Sheedy 
Sales and Monetary Policy 
886  Andrew E. Clark 
David Masclet 
Marie-Claire Villeval 
Effort and Comparison Income 
Experimental and Survey Evidence 
885 Alex  Bryson 
Richard B. Freeman 
How Does Shared Capitalism Affect Economic 
Performance in the UK? 
884 Paul  Willman 
Rafael Gomez 
Alex Bryson 
Trading Places: Employers, Unions and the 
Manufacture of Voice 
883  Jang Ping Thia  The Impact of Trade on Aggregate 
Productivity and Welfare with Heterogeneous 
Firms and Business Cycle Uncertainty 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel 020 7955 7284  Fax 020 7955 7595  Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site http://cep.lse.ac.uk  